Mercer Law Review
Volume 50
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 16

7-1999

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons: The Interplay
Between Supplemental Jurisdiction and Cross-System Appeals,
and the Impact on Federalism
Jacob Edward Daly

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Daly, Jacob Edward (1999) "City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons: The Interplay Between
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Cross-System Appeals, and the Impact on Federalism," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 50 : No. 4 , Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol50/iss4/16

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons: The Interplay Between
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Cross-System
Appeals, and the Impact on Federalism

In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,' the United
States Supreme Court reversed a well-established rule in holding that
federal district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims for deferential review of local administrative agency
decisions. 2
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

North Lake Shore Drive in Chicago was once home to the wealthiest
and most prominent Chicagoans. Today, however, only seven of the
elegant homes that once lined Lake Shore Drive between North Avenue
and Oak Street remain. The International College of Surgeons ("ICS")
owns two of these mansions-the Edward T. Blair House, which contains
ICS's administrative offices, and the Eleanor Robinson Countiss House,
which contains the International Museum of Surgical Science.3
In July 1988 the Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural
Landmarks ("Commission") preliminarily determined that the seven
homes on Lake Shore Drive, including the Blair House and the Countiss
House, qualified as a landmark district pursuant to the city's landmarks
Seven months later, ICS contracted for the sale and
ordinance.
redevelopment of the Blair House and the Countiss House. Under the
contract, the developer was to demolish all but the facades of the two
buildings and construct a high-rise condominium tower in their place.
In June 1989, however, the city council enacted an ordinance ("designation ordinance") officially designating these seven buildings as a
landmark district. The landmarks ordinance required developers to

1. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).

2. Id. at 174.
3. International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, Nos. 91 C 1587, 91 C 5564,
1995 WL 9243, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1995) (unpublished decision).
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obtain a permit from the Commission before demolishing a designated
landmark. Accordingly, ICS applied for the necessary permits in
October 1990.'
The Commission denied ICS's permit applications, finding that
demolition of the Blair House and the Countiss House would have a
deleterious effect on the landmark district. Pursuant to the Illinois
Administrative Review Act ("IARA"), which provides for judicial review
of decisions of municipal landmarks commissions in the state's circuit
courts, ICS filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking
review of the Commission's denial of its permit applications. The
complaint alleged that the landmarks and designation ordinances
violated, both facially and as applied, several federal constitutional
provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The complaint also alleged similar violations of the Illinois
Constitution and sought deferential, or on-the-record, administrative
review of the Commission's decision.5
Relying on federal question jurisdiction, the city removed the lawsuit
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. s
ICS moved to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Cook County, but
the district court denied the motion.7 Without elaborating, the district
court ruled that removal was proper because it had original jurisdiction
over ICS's federal constitutional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.8
The district court also exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state
constitutional claims and the request for administrative review.9
In the meantime, ICS reapplied for the permits pursuant to a
provision of the landmarks ordinance that allowed exceptions if the
applicant demonstrated that denial of the permits would result in
economic hardship. The Commission again denied the applications,
finding that ICS would not suffer economic hardship as defined by the
landmarks ordinance. Consequently, ICS filed another lawsuit in the
Circuit Court of Cook County alleging substantially the same federal and
state constitutional violations and seeking deferential administrative
review of the Commission's denial of its permit applications based on
economic hardship.1"

4. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 159-60.
5. Id. at 160.
6. Id. at 161.

7.

International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, No. 91 C 1587, 1991 WL

171350, at *2 (N.D. hi. Aug. 29, 1991) (unpublished decision).

8. Id. at *1.
9. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 161.
10. Id. at 160.
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Again relying on federal question jurisdiction, the city removed the
second lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, and the district court consolidated the cases. 11 The
city then moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. As to the federal constitutional
12
claims, the district court granted the city's motion to dismiss in part
but reserved ruling on the state law claims until it resolved the
remaining federal constitutional claims. 8
The district court did not formally address its jurisdiction over ICS's
state law claims until January 1995, at which time it granted summary
judgment sua sponte for the city. 4 Despite granting summary judgment for the city on all remaining federal constitutional claims and
acknowledging its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to decline
jurisdiction over the state law claims, the district court nevertheless
continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
in the interests of "economy, convenience, fairness and comity." 5 In
addition to expressing concern about increasing the burdens of the
Illinois court system, the district court considered itself to be "in the best
position to resolve the remaining [state law] issues expeditiously." 6
After analyzing the state law claims, the district court granted summary
judgment for the city on all state constitutional claims and affirmed the
Commission's decisions denying ICS the permits. 7
ICS appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit unanimously reversed and remanded to the district court with
instructions to remand to the Circuit Court of Cook County." The
circuit court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because complaints for deferential review of state administrative

11. Id. at 161.
12. International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, Nos. 91 C 1587, 91 C 5564,
1992 WL 6729, at *5-6 (N.D. fl1. Jan. 10, 1992) (unpublished decision). Of ICS's ten federal
constitutional claims, the district court dismissed seven with prejudice and two without

prejudice. Id. The only federal constitutional claim that survived was ICS's equal
protection claim. Id. at *4.
13. Id. at *5 n.7.
14. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 1995 WL 9243, at *32.
15. Id. at *9. Contra Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 & n.7 (1988)
(recognizing that when all federal law claims have been dismissed from a lawsuit, district

courts should decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims because balancing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
usually indicates that federal jurisdiction is inappropriate).

16. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 1995 WL 9243, at *9.
17. Id. at *32.
18. International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981, 984-85 (7th Cir.
1996).
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agency decisions 9 are not "'civil action[s] ... of which the district
courts ... have original jurisdiction' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)." 20 The circuit court reasoned that because the IARA
required deferential review of administrative agency decisions, judicial
review of the Commission's decisions denying ICS the demolition permits
was actually an appellate proceeding "that [was] inconsistent with the
character of a court of original jurisdiction" and the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). 2'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 22 to decide
whether federal district courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases that
include both federal law claims and state law claims that require
deferential review of local administrative agency decisions. 23 The Court
reversed the circuit court's decision and held that state law claims
requiring deferential review of local administrative agency decisions are
within the purview of supplemental jurisdiction.2 4 Because the circuit
court failed to address section 1367(c) or abstention, the Court also
remanded to allow the circuit court to consider those issues in the first
instance.2 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A case may be removed from a state court to a federal district court
only if it could have been brought in that federal district court originally.26 Thus, to remove a case the district court must have either

19.

Opinions involving cross-system appellate review often imprecisely refer to federal

district court review of state or local administrative agency decisions. In fact, review of
state administrative agency decisions by federal district courts seems to be prohibited by
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The proper scope of crosssystem appellate review (and of the Court's holding in InternationalCollege of Surgeons)
is limited to federal district court review of local administrative agency decisions. See infra,
note 108.
20. International College of Surgeons, 91 F.3d at 994 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1994)).
21. Id. at 990. The circuit court noted that "in determining whether a state action
seeking judicial review of a state administrative agency's decision is removable, the focus
must be upon the character of the state proceeding and upon the nature of the review
conducted by the state court." Id. Thus, the court acknowledged that removal of a state
action to federal district court is proper "[i]f the state administrative review process
provides for a trial de novo" because conducting a trial de novo is a proper district court

function. Id.
22. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 520 U.S. 1164 (1997).
23. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163.

24. Id. at 166.
25. Id. at 174.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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27
independent jurisdiction for each claim, founded on a federal question
229
or diversity," or supplemental
jurisdiction.29 Complications arise in
cases in which nondiverse parties raise both federal law claims and state
law claims over which the federal district court has no independent
jurisdiction, but which may fall within the district court's supplemental
jurisdiction. The scope of supplemental jurisdiction, which has proven
to be difficult to ascertain despite numerous cases interpreting it,3" lies
at the heart of the Court's opinion in InternationalCollege of Surgeons.
Accordingly, Part A summarizes the law regarding supplemental
jurisdiction. Part B then discusses two decisions relied on by ICS and
the Seventh Circuit which reflect the Supreme Court's disinclination,
before International College of Surgeons, to allow federal jurisdiction
over state law claims seeking deferential review of state or local
administrative agency decisions.

A.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Historically, there was no express constitutional or statutory authority
for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a case involving both
federal law claims and state law claims over which it had no independent basis for jurisdiction.3' Chief Justice John Marshall, however,
endorsed such jurisdiction when he declared:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the
Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts

27. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
30. For judicial criticism of pendent jurisdiction, the common law ancestor of section
1367, see infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. Additionally, almost immediately after
Congress enacted section 1367 in 1990, commentators roundly criticized it as vague,
ambiguous, and confusing. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and
Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40
EMORY L.J. 445 (1991); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Graspingat Burnt Straws:
The Disasterof the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991). Because
of mounting criticism, the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project ("FJCRP") was
commissioned under the authority of the American Law Institute to redraft the statute to
eradicate the problems associated with it. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT: TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, at 16-20, 25-30 (describing
the technical and conceptual shortcomings of the present section 1367) [hereinafter
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2]. The Indiana Law Journal recently joined the controversy by
sponsoring a symposium dedicated to the proposed revision of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute. See Symposium, A Reappraisalof the Supplemental-JurisdictionStatute: Title 28
U.S.C. § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 1 (1998).
31. ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.4, at 327 (3d ed. 1999).
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jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may
be involved in it. 2
From this proclamation was born the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.'
Although hailed as beneficial to the judicial process, the Supreme Court's
early jurisprudence failed to articulate a coherent constitutional
standard for applying pendent jurisdiction.34
In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,35 however, the Court
attempted to end the "considerable confusion" that resulted from
previous formulations of the constitutional standard for exercising
pendent jurisdiction. 6 The Court held that pendent jurisdiction was
appropriate whenever a case involved at least one substantial claim that
arose under federal law and a state law claim so related to that federal
law claim that they constituted a single case in that they "derive[d] from
a common nucleus of operative fact." 7 However, the Court cautioned
against indiscriminate application of pendent jurisdiction by observing
that the "power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found
to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is
a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."" The Court noted that
federal courts should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction (1) when
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" favor state court
jurisdiction, (2) when the state law claims "substantially predominate,"
(3) when the federal law claims are dismissed prior to trial, or (4) when
39
other considerations, such as jury confusion, warrant separate trials.
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,40 like InternationalCollege of
Surgeons, concerned the scope of supplemental and federal question
jurisdiction in the context of removal. 4' In that case the Court interpreted Gibbs "as conferring substantial discretion on the trial courts to
assert or decline jurisdiction over pendent claims, guided only by the
ultimate values of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to

32. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 326, 362, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824)
(emphasis added). The constitutional basis for the jurisdiction endorsed by Chief Justice

Marshall appears to be Article III's extension of the judicial power to entire "cases" and
"controversies," not just single claims or issues. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31.
33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31.
34. Id. at 327, 330-31; see also Cohill, 484 U.S. at 349 & n.6 (characterizing the preGibbs standard as "murky" and difficult to apply because "it centered on the inherently
elusive concept of a 'cause of action'").
35. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
36. Id. at 724 (citing Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933)).
37. Id. at 725.
38. Id. at 726.
39. Id. at 726-27.
40. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
41. Id. at 345.
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litigants, and comity."42 Indeed, the Court stated that the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction must be flexible enough to allow federal district
courts to evaluate pendent claims in a way that "most sensibly
accommodates" these values.' The Court reminded the lower federal
courts to consider and weigh these values throughout the course of
litigation, not just when a case is filed. 44 Thus, balancing these values
may indicate that a case is properly in federal court when it is filed, but
subsequent events may alter the balance such that the case no longer
belongs there.4" For example, if a federal district court dismisses all
federal law claims before final adjudication, the balance of these values
normally indicates that it should decline to continue exercising
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims by dismissing the case
without prejudice or by remanding the case to the state court from which
it was removed."
Congress codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990."' The new statute provides that federal
district courts shall have "supplemental" jurisdiction over all state law
claims transactionally related to claims properly within the courts'
original jurisdiction."
The statute further provides circumstances
under which federal district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.49 Because the statute essentially codified existing case law

42.

1 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., LITIGATING CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-

TION CASES § 17.40, at 673 (1996).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350 & n.7, 357.
1 LEWIS, supra note 42, at 674.

48. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This section provides that:
[In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.
Id.
49.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This section provides that:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction.
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regarding pendent jurisdiction, the cases interpreting that doctrine
remain important. 50
B.

The Tradition Against Allowing Cross-System Appeals
Since 1954 lower federal courts have relied on two Supreme Court
cases, both analogous to International College of Surgeons, to prohibit
federal district court review of decisions of state and local administrative
agencies, boards, or commissions.5" The first, Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad v. Stude,52 involved a condemnation proceeding by the
railroad against Stude.53 Unhappy with the assessment of damages,
the railroad concurrently filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa and appealed to the District
Court for Pottawattamie County pursuant to Iowa law.54 After the
railroad removed the state court appeal to the federal district court, the
court denied Stude's motion to remand.5 In concluding that removal
was improper and that the case should have been remanded, the
Supreme Court held that federal district courts "do[] not sit to review on
appeal action taken administratively or judicially in a state proceeding.
A state 'legislature may not make a federal district court, a court of
original jurisdiction, into an appellate tribunal or otherwise expand its
jurisdiction . . . .'"

Noting that neither Congress nor the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure authorized such an appeal, the Court explained
that only after an appeal of local administrative action has been
perfected in state court may a federal district court assume jurisdiction.57 Only when this occurs does the appeal become a civil action
over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction.5

Id.
50.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31.

51. See, e.g., Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 120 F.3d 196 (9th Cir. 1997);
Armistead v. C & M Transp., Inc., 49 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1995); Fairfax County Redev. &
Hous. Auth. v. W.M. Schlosser Co., 64 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1995); Labiche v. Louisiana
Patients' Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 69 F.3d 21 (5th Cir. 1995); Frison v. Franklin
County Bd. of Educ., 596 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1979); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972); Trapp v. Goetz, 373 F.2d 380
(10th Cir. 1966). But see Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 248
F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1957) (affirming the district court's assumption of jurisdiction over an
appeal from an order of a state commission).
52. 346 U.S. 574 (1954).

53. Id. at 575.
54. Id. at 576-77.
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id. at 581 (quoting Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317 (1943)).

57. Id.
58. Id. at 578.
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Seven years later the Court modified Stude in Horton v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.59 In Horton Liberty Mutual appealed a decision
of the Texas Industrial Accident Board to a federal district court
pursuant to the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, which provided
for appeals to be conducted as trials de novo. 6° Distinguishing Stude
on the ground that a "'suit to set aside an award of the board is in fact
a suit, not an appeal,"'6 1 the Court held that federal district court
jurisdiction was proper.6 2 Therefore, the determinative factor is how
the state or local law upon which an appeal is based defines the
"appellate" proceeding.' If the state or local law provides for deferential review, the appellate proceeding will not be deemed a civil action of
which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction.6 However,
if the state or local law provides for de novo review, the appellate
proceeding will be deemed a6civil
action within the original jurisdiction
5
of the federal district courts.

Until International College of Surgeons, lower federal courts consistently refused to exercise supplemental or diversity jurisdiction, either
originally or by removal, over state law claims for deferential review of
state and local administrative agency decisions. 66 The Ninth Circuit
summarized the near-unanimous view of the circuits when it observed
that "the prospect of a federal court sitting as an appellate court over
state administrative proceedings is rather jarring and should not be
quickly embraced as a matter of policy." 7
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice O'Connor reversed the
judgment of the circuit court and held that the district court properly

59. 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
60. Id. at 349.
61. Id. at 354 (quoting Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 123 S.W.2d 322,328 (Tex.
1938)).
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id. at 354.
64. Id. at 354-55. See.e.g., Howell v. Harden, 203 S.E.2d 206, 207 (Ga. 1974) (holding
that "the judicial review contemplated [by the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act] is
appellate in nature and is not such a 'pretrial, trial or post trial procedure' as is provided
for by the Civil Practice Act").
65. 367 U.S. at 354-55. See, e.g., Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 38
N.E.2d 754, 757 (Ill. 1941) ("A statute of this nature which designates the procedure as an
'appeal' but provides for a hearing 'de novo'... does not confer appellate jurisdiction upon
the court, but merely authorizes it to exercise its original jurisdiction.").
66. See supra note 51.
67. Shamrock Motors, 120 F.3d at 200.
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exercised supplemental jurisdiction over ICS's state law claims despite
their appellate nature.' In reaching this conclusion, the Court held
that the plain language of section 1367(a) does not indicate a congressional intention to prohibit federal jurisdiction over supplemental state law
claims that require deferential review of local administrative agency
decisions.6 9 However, the Court also acknowledged that while section
1367(a) authorizes federal district courts to exercise such jurisdiction, it
does not require them to do so."0 Because the Court noted that section
1367(c) or an abstention doctrine may militate against exercising
jurisdiction, it remanded the case for the circuit court to consider in the
first instance whether the district court should have declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c) or an abstention
doctrine.7
The Court began by noting that a case filed in state court may be
removed to federal court only if the appropriate federal district court has
original jurisdiction.7 2 Original jurisdiction exists in the federal district

courts if a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal
law. 78 The Court observed that ICS's complaints raised several federal
constitutional challenges to the landmarks and designation ordinances
and to the manner in which the Commission conducted the demolition
permit hearings. 74 The Court explained that although ICS raised its
federal constitutional claims by way of a state cause of action, those
claims "unquestionably" arose under federal law because ICS's wellpleaded complaint demonstrated that the relief it sought under state law

68. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 174.
69. Id. at 169.
70. Id. at 172.
71. Id. at 174.
72. Id. at 163.
73. Id. To satisfy the statutory requirement that a claim "aris[e] under" federal law,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, a well-pleaded complaint must demonstrate at a minimum that a federal
law creates the cause of action or that a state law claim necessarily depends on an
interpretation of a federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). It is insufficient for a question of federal
law to be merely "'lurking in the background,'" id. at 12 (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank
in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936)), or for a complaint to refute an anticipated federal
law defense; a federal law must be an essential element of the claim. Id. at 10-12.
Significantly, the Court's federal question jurisprudence has depended in large part on the
nature of the federal interest involved. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 814 n.12 (1986). Compare Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201
(1921) (claims turning on federal constitutional issues deemed to arise under federal law),
with Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 291 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1934) (claims turning on
federal statutory issues not deemed to arise under federal law).
74. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 164.
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necessarily depended on an interpretation of a federal law.75 Thus, the
Court concluded that the district court had original jurisdiction over the
federal constitutional claims under to section 1331.76
Despite admitting that some of its claims arose under federal law, ICS
contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction because its state law
claims for deferential review of the Commission's decisions did not
constitute a "'civil action ... of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction.'" 77 The Court rejected that argument
because it was based on the erroneous premise that the original
jurisdiction of federal district courts derives from state law claims.7"
The proper inquiry was whether the federal law claims constituted "'civil
actions' within the 'original jurisdiction' of the district courts for
purposes of removal."79 If so, the state law claims could rest on
supplemental jurisdiction if they were transactionally related to the
federal law claims that were within the district court's original
jurisdiction. But the presence of state law claims did not "alter[] the fact
that ICS's complaints, by virtue of their federal claims,
were 'civil
' S°
actions' within the federal courts' 'original jurisdiction. "
Having established federal question jurisdiction, the Court then
considered whether the state law claims were within the district court's
supplemental jurisdiction.8 1 Relying on Gibbs and section 1367(a), the
Court held that the district court properly exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims because both the state and federal
law claims derived from the same core of facts-the Commission's
denials of ICS's demolition permit applications.8 2 ICS contended that
supplemental jurisdiction is proper only when the state law claims fall
within the district court's original jurisdiction, but the Court rejected
that argument because such an approach "would effectively read the
supplemental jurisdiction statute out of the books.""
The Court

75. Id. The Court distinguished Merrell Dow on the ground that the federal law claim
in that case was not sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction. Id. at
168. In accordance with Merrell Dow's distinction between federal statutory claims and
federal constitutional claims, the Court apparently considered ICS's federal law claims to
be sufficiently substantial to establish federal question jurisdiction because they were
based directly and solely on the United States Constitution. See supra note 73.
76. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 165-66.
77. Id. at 166 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
80. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
81. Id. at 164-65.
82. Id. at 165-66.
83. Id. at 167.
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explained that ICS's logic was flawed because the very purpose of
supplemental jurisdiction "is to allow the district courts to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over claims as to which original jurisdiction is
lacking. " '
Turning next to ICS's argument that federal district courts may not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that require
deferential review of local administrative agency decisions, the Court
held that nothing in the text of section 1367(a) indicated such an
exception.85
"Instead, the statute generally confers supplemental
jurisdiction over 'all other claims' in the same case or controversy as a
federal question, without reference to the nature of review."86 Additionally, the Court held that its decisions in Stude and Horton do not
suggest an exception to supplemental jurisdiction for state law claims
that require deferential review of local administrative agency decisions.8 7 The Court distinguished those cases as determining whether
a state law claim for judicial review of state administrative agency
action falls within the scope of the district courts' diversity jurisdiction,
not whether such a claim falls within supplemental jurisdiction in a case
founded on a federal question.88 Nevertheless, assuming that Stude
and Horton were relevant to the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in
federal question cases, the Court held that those cases supported the
district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case.89
Despite Horton's emphasis on the standard of review mandated by the
statute or ordinance that governed appeals of state or local administrative action, the Court explained that reliance on the standard of review
was misguided because neither Stude nor Horton "suggest[ed] that
jurisdiction turned on whether judicial review of the administrative
determination was deferential or de novo."9 ° Moreover, the Court noted
that "[a]ny negative inference that might be drawn" from those cases
was insufficient to trump the plain language of section 1367(a), which
does not suggest that supplemental jurisdiction depends on the
applicable standard of review."
Finally, the Court emphasized the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction and stated that federal district courts "'should consider
and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

168-69.
169 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).

170.
171.
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of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity'" when deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.9 2
The Court also
observed that an abstention doctrine might obligate a federal district
court to refrain from adjudicating a state law claim when "'denying a
federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."' 3 The district court refused to decline jurisdiction under section
1367(c), 94 but neither it nor the circuit court addressed the possibility
of abstention. The Supreme Court, therefore, remanded to allow the
circuit court to consider those issues in the first instance.9 5
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, criticized the
majority on four grounds. First, the dissent claimed that the majority
departed from the overwhelming weight of precedent disfavoring crosssystem appellate review by federal district courts.9 Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg found only one circuit court opinion that had approved such
review. 97 Moreover, given "the near-unanimous view of the Circuits
that federal courts may not engage in cross-system appellate review,"
Congress could not be said to have authorized cross-system appeals
merely by providing for supplemental jurisdiction.9" Thus, the dissent
argued that cross-system appeals should be allowed only if Congress

92. Id. at 173 (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350).
93. Id. at 174 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)).
94. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 1995 WL 9243, at *9.
95. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 174. On remand, the circuit court
held that the district court was not required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under
either the Burford or Pullman abstention doctrine. International College of Surgeons v.
City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the Burford abstention
doctrine, "federal courts will abstain from deciding unsettled questions of state law that
relate to a complex state regulatory scheme." Id. at 361. The district court was not
required to abstain under the Burford abstention doctrine because the law governing the
only remaining state law claim was well settled and because the IARA did not provide for
a specialized forum to litigate claims. Id. at 362-65. Under the Pullman abstention
doctrine, "acourt abstains in order to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication." Id.
at 361. Pullman abstention was not required because the law governing the only
remaining state law claim was well settled and because the district court disposed of all
federal constitutional claims via summary judgment. Id. at 365. The circuit court further
held that ICS waived the argument that the district court should have declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c) because it failed to raise that argument in
the district court. Id. at 366.
96. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For
the cases cited by Justice Ginsburg that the majority's decision overruled, see supra note
51.
97. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
Range Oil Supply Co., 248 F.2d at 478-79).
98. Id. at 191.
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explicitly authorizes them.9 Second, the dissent expressed surprise at
the majority's view that Stude and Horton did not differentiate between
cross-system appeals that provide for de novo review of state or local
administrative action and those that require deferential review."°
Third, the dissent criticized the majority for not respecting "the
separateness of state and federal adjudicatory systems" and for
"permit[ting] the federal court to supplant the State's entire scheme for
judicial review of local administrative actions."1 ' Federal jurisdiction
was particularly improper in this case, argued the dissent, because no
Illinois appellate court had ever interpreted the landmarks ordinance or
decided the state constitutional issues raised by ICS.'0 2 Finally, the
dissent opined that section 1367(c) and the various abstention doctrines
were inadequate safeguards against such potential encroachments on
state and local sovereignty.'
For example, because section 1367(c) is
inapplicable to diversity cases, federal district courts have no discretionary power to decline jurisdiction over cross-system appeals brought
under section 1332.1°' Additionally, lower federal courts have found
the abstention doctrines to be confusing and difficult to apply.0 5
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's holding in International College of Surgeons
07
°
qualifies as a "watershed decision"" and a "landmark result"
because it delineates the breadth of the federal district courts' power to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In holding that section 1367(a)
"generally confers supplemental jurisdiction over 'all other claims' in the
same case or controversy as a federal question, without reference to the
nature of review,"' the Court disturbed a deeply-rooted understand-

99. Id. at 176.
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id. at 187-88.
103. Id. at 189.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 175.
107. Id. at 180.
108. Id. at 169 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). Although the Court implied that the
federal district courts' power to exercise jurisdiction is plenary, section 1367(c) and the
abstention doctrines somewhat limit that power. Also, the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution prevents federal district court jurisdiction over cases involving
review of state administrative decisions. Id. at 177 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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ing that federal district courts "do[] not sit to review on appeal action
taken administratively or judicially in a state proceeding." 1 9
Justice Ginsburg warned that the majority's decision will enlarge
federal jurisdiction by permitting litigants to routinely appeal decisions
of local administrative agencies, boards, and commissions in federal
district courts, irrespective of the basis for federal jurisdiction.110
Justice Ginsburg explained that the majority's decision permits access,
either originally or by removal, to federal district courts for any litigant
who is dissatisfied with a local agency's decision and who establishes
diversity of citizenship or raises a federal question."' Admittedly,
diversity will seldom support federal district court jurisdiction in crosssystem appeals because the complainant will usually be a citizen of the
same state as the local agency. However, federal district court
jurisdiction could almost always be based on a federal question because
it is easy and common to allege a due process violation in the local
agency's procedure or decision. Thus, cross-system appellate review may
transform federal district courts into superintendents of local agencies." 2
Moreover, the majority's decision renders the Burford abstention
doctrine almost meaningless in the context of cross-system appeals of
local administrative agency decisions. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., the
Supreme Court recognized the "'rightful independence of the state
governments'" and the need for "'harmonious relation between state and
federal authority.""' The Court thus held that federalism counsels
federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over issues
involving complex state administrative procedures." 4 In Quackenbush
v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Court interpreted Burford to require
abstention only if the state interests in maintaining uniformity in the
treatment of local problems and retaining control over its governmental
processes outweigh the federal interests in exercising jurisdiction."'
The Court has observed that state interests rarely outweigh federal
interests." 6 Therefore, the Burford abstention doctrine is an "extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of [the district courts] to

109. Stude, 346 U.S. at 581.
110. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 177.
112. Id. at 175; see also TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 30, at xx.
113. 319 U.S. at 332 (quoting Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500, 501 (1941)).
114. Id.
115. 517 U.S. at 726-28 (examining the justification for and the evolution of the Burford
abstention doctrine).
116. Id. at 728.
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adjudicate a controversy properly before [them]." 7 In its remand
decision in InternationalCollege of Surgeons, the Seventh Circuit further
restricted the Burford abstention doctrine by holding that abstention is
appropriate only if the state provides a specialized forum in which
claims may be litigated."" Thus, without further guidance from the
Supreme Court, application of the Burford abstention doctrine to the
majority's decision is likely to cause conflicts among the circuits. To
dispel this confusion, the Court may be forced to develop a "Chicago"
abstention doctrine to govern cross-system appeals." 9
Although it is too soon to determine whether Justice Ginsburg's
prophecy will be fulfilled, at least five subsequent cases have sanctioned
cross-system appellate review based on International College of
Surgeons.2 ° Carefully read, the majority's decision merely represents
a grant of jurisdictional power, not a directive to exercise that power. 2' Yet the disposition of these five cases illustrates the dangers
inherent in the majority's decision. First, in four of these cases the
courts ignored the majority's admonition to consider section 1367(c) or
abstention doctrines before exercising jurisdiction over cross-system
appeals.'2 2 In the fifth, the district court refused to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction under Burford because it felt bound to exercise
the jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress."
Regardless, relying on
the Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of Burford in its International College of Surgeons decision on remand,1' the district court in that
case ruled that defendant failed to satisfy either prong of the Burford
abstention doctrine. 125 Thus, as these five cases make clear, lower

117. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
118. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 153 F.3d at 363-65. Currently there is a split
among the circuits as to whether the Burford abstention doctrine requires the existence'of
a specialized forum. Id. at 364 n.9.
119. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); M &
Z Cab Corp. v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. fI1. 1998); United States v. Illinois
Pollution Control Bd., 17 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Schullo v. Town of Cicero, No.
97 C 6456, 1998 WL 417598 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1998) (unpublished decision); Cardenas v.
Fire & Police Comm'n of Milwaukee, 990 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
121. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 174 ("The District Court properly
recognized that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.. . .") (emphasis added).
122. Lacks, 147 F.3d at 721; M & Z Cab Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 945; Schullo, 1998 WL
417598, at *5-6; Cardenas,990 F. Supp. at 646.
123. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 806. Federal jurisdiction in
Illinois Pollution Control Bd. was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1345; therefore, the district
court had no reason to consider declining jurisdiction under section 1367(c). Id. at 801.
124. See supra note 95; supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 806-07.
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federal courts may interpret the majority's decision as a virtual
requirement to exercise jurisdiction over cross-system appeals.12
Therefore, the majority's decision implicates federalism in several
significant respects. In sanctioning cross-system appellate review of
decisions of local administrative agencies, the Court upset the historical
relationship between state and federal courts by applying a plain
meaning interpretation of section 1367(a) that appears to be inconsistent
Specifically, International College of
with congressional intent.'27
Surgeons threatens to expand the historical understanding of what
constitutes a removable civil action by permitting removal of actions
containing claims that are beyond independent or supplemental federal
jurisdiction and are thus outside the realm of the original jurisdiction of
Moreover, federal district courts are virtually
federal courts. 2 '
powerless to decline jurisdiction over cases properly brought unless
section 1367(c) or an abstention doctrine applies.' 29 Because declining
jurisdiction under section 1367(c) is completely discretionary and
Burford abstention is rare, the majority's decision stands as a "startling
...reallocation of power from state courts to federal courts."3 0 Crosssystem appellate review further offends federalism because it allows
federal district courts to subvert state mechanisms for reviewing local
agency decisions.' 31 States and localities have an overriding interest
in adjudicating disputes that arise from enforcement of their administrative law because that law "regulates the citizen's contact with state and
local government" in all facets of life.'32 As a general rule, state and
federal courts are presumed equally competent to decide cases involving
federal law,'33 but state courts are deemed superior to federal courts

126. But see Nevares v. Morrissey, No. 95 Coy. 1135(JGK), 1998 WL 265119, at *4, *8
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1998) (unpublished decision) (acknowledging the authority to exercise
jurisdiction under InternationalCollege of Surgeons, but stating that doing so would be
improper under section 1367(c)).
127. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 30, at 56. "Such a far-reaching change in the
historic function of the district courts should flow from more than a semantic wrinkle in
a statute utterly devoid of any apparent purpose to accomplish that end." Id. at xx.
128. Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents:Supplemental Jurisdiction,Removal, and the ALI
Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 75, 86-90, 99 (1998). According to the FJCRP, its most recent
proposed revision of section 1367 would effectively overrule International College of
Surgeons. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 30, at 56-57.
129. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716.
130. InternationalCollege of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 180.
132. Id. at 185.
133. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 274-76 (1997). This

characterization represents the vast majority of cases, but there are some cases over which
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) (disputes
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in adjudicating cases involving state law."
Thus, the majority's
decision jeopardizes the delicate balance of power contemplated by
federalism by allowing excessive federal intrusion on state and local
sovereignty.
Although it remains to be seen how vigorously the federal district
courts will exercise this newfound jurisdiction and whether they will be
reluctant to decline to exercise it under section 1367(c) or an abstention
doctrine, InternationalCollege of Surgeons is significant because it has
the potential to undermine historical understandings about the limits of
federal judicial power.
JACOB EDWARD DALY

between states); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (admiralty, maritime, and prize cases).
134. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 327 ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless
federal conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this double system of
review."); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (reaffirming the domestic
relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction); Haiderman,465 U.S. at 122 n.32
("[W]hen a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's construction often
is uncertain and ephemeral.").

